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THIS issue of the JOURNAL completes the third volume. We
have followed in the main the plan of 6ur predecessors, departing
from it only in the addition of the department of Memorabilia.
By making this a supplement, we have preserved the formal char-
acter of the JOURNAL, and at the same time have added a feature
which we hope will prove both interesting and valuable. We
have tried to keep abreast of the growth of the Law School and
we take this last opportunity to publicly thank both our contrib-
utors and subscribers and to acknowledge our obligations for the
warm support which we have received on all sides.
To the student of corporation law no topic appears to be
involved in more hopeless confusion than the so-called ultra vires
doctrine as applied to private corporations. Judging from a careful
reading of elaborate opinions of the various courts of last resort,
it is apparent that our judges labor under the same difficulty. Nor
does the perplexity end here. If it did, we might well dismiss
the subject from consideration as one of no practical importance.
But involving as it does the validity of all contractual obligations
in favor of or against corporations, and the great majority of
industrial enterprises being conducted by corporations, the proper
solution of the problem is a thing of the greatest moment. The
doctrine undoubtedly has its origin in the theory that a corpora-
tion is the creature of government, that the powers conferred
upon it are franchises and in derogation of common right and the
sovereignty of the state. And this theory is true in the case of
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municipal corporations; there was some ground also for the appli-
cation of this theory to private corporations when they were
authorized by royal grant or special act of the legislature. Yet,
even then, most of the powers of private corporations were not
franchises, but rather attributes given to the corporation by the
authorized contract between its members. The right to be a cor-
poration is an undoubted franchise; so also is the right of eminent
domain; the former belonging to the shareholders, the latter to
the corporation, by virtue of grant from the state. Few private
corporations have any other franchises. The right of banking
corporations to issue notes to circulate as money comes within the
true definition of a franchise. Every grant of franchises being in
derogation of common right and a limitation upon, or an abridge-
ment of, the sovereignty of the state, the state has an interest in
preventing the usurpation of franchises and may properly adopt
stringent rules for the prevention or punishment of such usurpa-
tion. But this can hardly be said concerning the attributes of
corporations or those powers which are not franchises, but rather
find their only origin in the agreement of the members. It can
scarcely be maintained that the public has any interest in the
exercise by a private corporation of powers of the latter class,
where it would not also have a like interest in the exercise of such
powers by private individuals. In other words, an act performed
by a private corporation can be opposed to public policy only
when the same act would be contrary to public policy if per-
formed by an individual. One law and one policy ought to
govern both. But in some jurisdictions a contract involving
the exercise of a mere power not included in the constating
instruments of the corporation, even though it meet with the
approval of every member of the company, is held void equally
with a contract involving the usurpation of a franchise. In
other jurisdictions, the same theory is promulgated, but in
case the contract is of the class mentioned, multitudinous excep-
tions are allowed on the doctrine of estoppel or other equitable
principles. Is there any reason, apart from the principles of the
law of agency, for adjudging to be void, on the ground of public
policy, contracts of corporations unless they are usurpations of a
franchise or would be opposed to public policy or public law if
made by private citizens? The whole force of the doctrine of the
common law that the unauthorized exercise of corporate powers is
opposed to public policy and therefore void, in so far as it is
applied to the exercise of mere powers or attributes, not franchises,
is broken by the enactment of general laws permitting freely the
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formation of corporations. For it is clear that, under existing
circumstances, mere powers or attributes are not conferred upon
private corporations by the state, but by the members who
enter into the contract which brings the corporation into existence.
The conferring of powers lies in the will of the corporators, con-
siderations of public policy being satisfied by compliance with
provisions relating to the filing of the articles of association with
the Secretary of State or other designated officer, and the payment
of the imposed fees. The corporators create the corporation
under authority of law. It is believed that true public policy
requires the enforcement of corporate contracts, unless they
involve an usurpation of a franchise (and probably in most cases
even then), or unless they are illegal on grounds equally applicable
to contracts between natural persons. The remedy for unauthorized
corporate action usurping public franchises should lie with the
state; and, unless the state chooses to object either by its prose-
cuting officer or upon the relation of an interested private citizen,
there is no one who can reasonably coml61ain. Of course all this
is upon the assumption that the acts under consideration are really
the acts of the corporation in accordance with the settled princi-
ples of the law of agency. If the supposed corporate contract be
not authorized by the corporation, the only parties entitled to
,object are the corporation and the shareholders. That is no con-
cern of the public. It is a mere question of agency and should be
settled accordingly. The remedy for really illegal contracts should
be the same as in the case of illegal contracts between natural
persons, with perhaps the additional remedy of a fine to be
recovered to the state or an ouster of franchises in flagrant cases.
On the other hand, the doctrine that all unauthorized contracts
made by a corporation are void for want of contracting power has
the merit of being logical if the premises are granted. But to
prevent injustice resulting from the application of this doctrine,
the right of the parties to such a contract to recover on-the ground
of quasi-contract for all benefits really enjoyed by the opposing
party in pursuance of such void contract, unless it be illegal on
other grounds, should be affirmed. This whole subject is a
problem most emphatically calling for legislative solution. The
adoption of either doctrine by the legislature and a consistent
application by the courts of the one adopted would confer
incalculable benefit by substituting certainty for uncertainty.
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